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THE "CONTINUATION" OF THE *ODYSSEY*¹

BY A. SHEWAN

B. IMITATION

A reaction against a view which has been almost universally accepted is in one respect like a brand-new theory that comes among men like a bolt from the blue—it must pass through three phases. First, it is jeered at; then comes a grudging admission that there may be something in it; and the last stage is, "of course, we always knew it." It is thus with the new attitude toward the question of the origin of the Homeric poems. In Germany especially, a stout protest has been made by a number of able scholars against the whole system of exegesis built up by Kirchhoff, Wilamowitz, Hennings, Robert, Fick, and a host of minor critics, and the protest has been effectual. *Communi sensu plane caruit* is the verdict on the Higher Criticism of Homer, and we are now at the point when the "unco wise" are wagging their heads and telling those who helped *rem restituere* that they are only flogging a dead horse, and trying to disprove things which they, the "unco wise," never believed.

It may be that this is so. It is equally true that many did believe, and do so still. To take one instance—it will not be denied that there were tracts in the epics which, in almost universal belief, had been proved to be late and inferior, and quite unfit to be fathered on the *Ur-Homer*, as that Protean creator happened to present himself to the mind of any one individual. And there are those still who, cherishing that belief, are confirmed in it by the reflection that formal refutation has in many cases never been forthcoming. The "Continuation" of the *Odyssey* is a case in point. We have had many demonstrations of its spuriousness—or rather an initial demonstration followed by rounds of applause from many later inquirers who added but little to the proof—and, till lately, hardly a serious attempt to defend it. The "unco wise" may have known all along that it was genuine and that the methods by which its condemnation

¹ Cf. *C.P.*, VIII, 284 ff.

was secured were contemptible; but, very unfortunately for Homer, they held their peace and failed to proclaim the faith that was in them.

Among the many means which used to be employed against the poems, the repetitions in the narrative had an honored place. The impulse to their use and abuse came from Hermann, who in his *De Iteratis* (1840) propounded the canon that repetitions are generally to be suspected, unless they are either the words of a messenger delivering his message, or merely formal lines belonging to the epic commonplace or *Gemeingut*. This dictum was accepted and acted on, even by Homerists of standing. It appears in the first edition of Leaf's *Iliad* (on O 263 ff.), and it is repeated with approval in Hennings' *Homers Odyssee* (1903, p. 36); and no weapon that has been forged by the destructive criticism of Homer has done greater service in the disruption of the epic structure.¹

The working principle thus enunciated is fundamentally wrong, for it involves a mistaken allocation of the burden of proof, and inquiry is poisoned at its source. *Prima facie* every line in Homer is entitled to stand *donec probetur in contrarium*, and repeated matter as much as any other. The burden of proof is on him who condemns. For there is nothing strange or unnatural about the practice of repetition in any early literature.² Economy of phraseology by way of repetition is a feature "that marks early national epics" (Andrew Lang, *H. and A.*, 102 f.; cf. his remarks in *J. Phil.*, XXXII, 3). The modern man must be as original as possible; the early poet had no such feeling to hamper him. If a thing was good, and all in Homer is good, it might be repeated; *δὲς ἡ τοῖς τὰ καλά*. And so

¹ It may be added that Hermann's exclusion of the commonplace has not been regarded. The formula and the phrase, aye, at times even the epithet, have been freely misused.

² I need not give examples; but I question if it is known how much repetition there is in authors of the classical periods of Greece and Rome. I refer to Wölffell, *Gleich- u. Anklänge bei Aesch.*; Fritzsche, *Die Wiederholungen bei Horaz*; Kellermann, *De Plauto sui imitatore*; for Vergil to Albrecht in *Hermes*, xvi, 393 ff., and for Ovid to *Mnemos.*, 1890, 164 ff. It is stated that Ovid's repetitions are more numerous than those of any other author except Homer. And more, the incongruities blamed in Homer are a common characteristic of Ovid's poetry. The poet takes some liberty in accommodating old matter to a new context. For Tennyson, a minute examination of the *Idylls* and *In Memoriam* has satisfied me that all the species of the Homeric repetitions are common.

repetitions abound in the two epics. They are more numerous than many readers of the text would believe. Schmidt (*Parallel-Lexikon*, pref.) calculates that the lines which recur, in whole or in part, amount to nearly one-third of the total, and that statement, as he shows, does not put the matter at its strongest. One can form an idea for oneself—it is a useful exercise—by comparing any one book, line by line and phrase by phrase, with the rest. A most careful analysis of this kind has been made for Λ by Ellendt (*Drei hom. Abh.*, 57 ff.), and it shows that there are few lines in that book of the *Iliad*, generally accepted as of the *Ur-poem*, for which, in whole or in part, exact equivalents or close parallels cannot be found.

For these reasons there is nothing to startle, much less to displease, the critic who approaches the poetry with an open mind, and with but one basic principle for poetry so situated as the Homeric, viz., Belzner's *der Dichter gibt uns die Regeln für sein Schaffen, nicht wir ihm*.¹ Repetition of matter is obviously a normal feature. There is nothing to raise an adverse presumption and so to shift the *onus probandi*. The disruptionist, on the other hand, eyed the repetitions askance, with something of the feeling of Herbert Spencer when he said of Macaulay's composition that it "resembled low organisms, being a repetition of similar parts." Hermann's initial suspicion jumped but too well with the inquirer's habitual attitude to the poetry—his conviction that the epics were the work of many hands in many ages. And he had only to add to this suspicion a soupçon of evidence—some small grammatical irregularity in the passage which he wished to eliminate, some discrepancy, some inferiority, or some other aberration, and the suspicion of the presence of the "sedulous ape" was made a certainty. Small wonder that the method became highly popular. It had the merit and attraction of simplicity; the veriest tyro could apply it, and did so in many treatises. Books were written on the Repetitions alone, *all in German* except one, Goldschmidt's *Gentagelserne i de homeriske Digte* (Copenhagen, 1900), a large and careful but not very illuminating compilation. I need name here only the outstanding works, Sittl's and Gemoll's (*Hermes*, xviii, 34 ff.) for the *Odyssey*, and Christ's

¹ Approved by Drerup, *Neue Wege u. Ziele der Homerforschung*, 26, and made cardinal in his recent work on E.

for the *Iliad*. But the output went on till Rothe, roused by the excesses that were being committed, published his *Bedeutung der Wiederholungen* in 1890. The effect was surprising. There has been no further separate publication of the kind. These efforts ceased on the moment, as cease the cries of a pack of Indian jackals when the angry sleeper steps outside his tent and discharges a barrel of his revolver. But the evil that men do lives after them. The *method* was too fruitful to be given up; and those familiar with the works of Robert, Fick, Wilamowitz, Hennings, and many others, well know what an amount of mischief has been caused.

This department of Homeric criticism—if criticism it can be called—degenerated in fact into a hunt for “peculiarity” on which to base an inference of plagiarism or imitation, and no peculiarity was too trivial to be overlooked. An aberration which clearly pointed to the bungling imitator—a rare variety, for imitators are generally careful—was seldom detected. When Thomson describes the sportive lambs “this way and that convolved, in friskful glee,” the critics recall Milton’s “writhed him to and fro convolved” of the Prince of Darkness—and laugh. Can anything of the sort be produced for Homer? Instead, the dependence is on small improprieties, chiefly in grammar—of all things wherewith to seek to pin down genius—and of a kind that in the cases of other authors are simply noted and left.¹ But it even became unnecessary to expose irregularity or something which the individual could pronounce repugnant to taste. A hysteria stage was reached in which the critic simply took the Concordance in hand, drew up a list of parallelisms or similarities, and then, in sublime disregard of Ellendt’s demonstration and the everlasting truth which it embodies, proclaimed the passage to be condemned a cento. Point was added to the proof by denouncing the author at every opportunity *quod omne molitur inepte*. This vituperation, it is well known, became a speciality of the Higher Criticism of Homer. Volkmann has

¹ Few have ever been more extreme to mark such peculiarities and to amend or excise than Nauck. Reference may be made to Ludwich’s *Polemik* (*Ar.*, II). Nauck did the same with Sophocles. Students of Jebb’s edition know how, on every other page of that great work, its author’s knowledge of the language and his feeling for the *ῥῆσος* of the dramatist make short work of Nauck’s objections, and restore nearly every line that he had sought to expel.

collected specimens in his *Nachträge*, ii, 16. For abuse of the plagiarist in particular, one might refer to Wilamowitz' section on the "Continuation" (*H.U.*, 67 ff.). Parts of the *Odyssey* are characterized by *slavische Abhängigkeit*, *notorische Flickcharacter*, *dürftigen Flickereien*, *stümperhaft Unschicklichkeit*, etc. There is "a want of polish" in this. "Invective is not argument." Or again, the case was bolstered up by means of strange expedients. Hennings (*op. cit.*, 587) proves borrowing in the *Nekyia* by a list of parallel passages. "One-third of all the verses"—not more than Ellendt found in Λ —"are borrowed or formal." But certain parts do not display this infirmity in the same degree. So "these may have been borrowed from lost poems"! And the imitation has not always been well done; there are "discrepancies." That only shows "how desultory the work of the Rhapsode was"! Surely the most unkindest cut of all! If there is one thing which we are to believe in this matter, it is that the Rhapsode, the *Flickpoet*, the *λόγιος ἀνὴρ*, the *Bearbeiter*, ἢ ὅστις δῆποτε χαίρει ὀνομαζόμενος, knew his Homer well and could patch you up a line, a passage, a cento, out of fragments culled from every part of the poems. He took pains with his mosaics. *Improbo labore splendor pannos undique corradit et consuit*, Naber says of him (*Q.H.*, 76).¹ And now to have a patron turn on him and reproach him with desultoriness! But what are we to say of such procedure? Just what Hennings himself, well capable of appreciating exuberant eccentricity in another, says of Fick's *Zahlenspiel*,—*das nenne ich nicht ein wissenschaftlichen Verfahren, sondern ein Lustexempel* (*W. kl. Phil.*, 1910, 490). Roemer asks (*Ein Dichter u. ein Kritiker*, 7) of just such another piece of criticism, "are we dealing with Homeric poets or with Byzantine Centonarii?"

Or the method may be estimated by results. The criteria employed are so weak that one can often retort by proving, *by the same method*, that the imitator is the imitated. Gemoll proved the *Doloneia* later than the *Odyssey* from the parallel passages, and Düntzer proved it earlier by exactly the same means. The *Doloneia* has also been shown in this way to be earlier than early parts of the *Iliad* (*Lay of Dolon*, 123 f.). Or the equations or inferences were sometimes stated in ignorance of the fact that some one

¹ In words unconsciously taken from Spohn, *De extrema Odysseae parte*, 91.

else had already used them the reverse way. That was inevitable. One critic says B 55 is taken from K 302; another, that K 302 is from B 55. Or take the case of K 242-44 and α 64-7; I know of 15 authorities who have studied the two passages, *all satisfied that there is plagiarism in the one or the other*. Of these 9 say the one is the imitator, and 6 that the other is. Or yet again, consider the lengths to which the process carried the enthusiasts who were satisfied a priori that the repetition meant imitation, and that all they had to do was to discover some flaw. Let me give two out of a number of extreme cases. Von Christ (*Wiederholungen*, 254) argues against Ψ 235 as compared with B 42, and this is how he depreciates it. "We too are in the habit, when we are wakened, of sitting up and pulling on our stockings; but when anyone wants to speak with us at such an early hour, we don't lie still in bed, but, unless illness prevents us, we go to meet him!" Sittl (p. 45) compares Σ 108 and ξ 464. "As singing at meals was a practice of the Greeks even in the heroic age, and so is not here considered to be a pernicious consequence of wine (?), I should be disposed to find in the latter passage a parechetic imitation of the former." I might add Wilamowitz' remarks, on B 42 and α 437 (*H.U.*, 8), on the impossibility of putting on a *χιτῶν ποδήρης* while sitting on a bed, for which it may suffice to refer to Hennings' rebuke (*op. cit.*, 72).¹ It is surely not too much to say that men who can allow a prejudice to carry them so far had better refrain altogether from criticizing epic poetry. Well does Erhardt say (*Entstehung*, XCV) that this procedure has been "one of the worst weaknesses of Homeric criticism," and stigmatize it as a "downright nuisance."

And these operations prove too much. If the experts are correct, a state of things results which no sane critic could accept. The total effect is unthinkable. Even Mr. Lang's "a thing of shreds and patches" is then no adequate description of the epic. Can we conceive the *unus color* and the *mirificus concentus* that Wolf admired to be the outcome of such ἀνήριθμον manipulation? Is it likely that the epics were ever subjected to such treatment, exposed to the attentions of the fools of every age,—the meddlers are always *Stümpers* or "*dolts*"—and that, if they were, this continued mal-

¹ And now to Professor Babbitt in *Class. Jour.*, VIII, 214.

feasance should issue in the production of the two great epics of the world?

This means of proving (in Erhardt's words) "almost anything one likes about any part of the Homeric poetry" has helped to establish the lateness and spuriousness of the "Continuation." In Spohn's day the repetitions had not assumed importance in Homeric criticism, but he gives a list and quotes Pope's opinion about those in the *Nekyia*. But his successor, Liesegang (*De extrema Odysseae parte diss.*, 1855), makes free use of them, and few who have discussed the "Continuation" since have failed to refer to this blot on it. I could not deal with all the demonstrations of the kind, even if I had "a heart of bronze within me" and the space in a volume of *Classical Philology* at my disposal. I will give one sample of the extreme form of procedure, from Hennings' work.

The opening of the "Continuation," ψ 297 ff., contains a recapitulation (ἀνακεφαλαίωσις) of the adventures of Odysseus, 310-42. Before the reunited husband and wife sleep, the former tells of all the "most disastrous chances," the "moving accidents by flood and field" that had befallen him in his wanderings; and as in other ἀνακεφαλαιώσεις in the poems, the poet *more suo* uses phrases which he had used before, sometimes more than once. An example is the narration of Achilles to Thetis in A 365 ff. Knowing the epic way, we expect many pieces of description to recur in the *ipsissima verba* used earlier in the book. Much the same may be said of the *Chrysëid*, A 430 ff. Besides the voyage to Chrysë and the return, and the sacrifice there, the episode contains a short speech by Odysseus, the restoration of Chrysëis and a prayer by her father. The epic "runs" describing the sailing and the sacrifice are of course in the formal language which is used on other similar occasions in the poems; the incidents at Chrysë are as naturally told in terms which have been used earlier in the narrative. And no one who has regard to epic practice finds anything to excite unfavorable remark. To the repetition-expert, however, it is *crambe repetita* which betrays the late, unscrupulous *Flickpoet*.

So Hennings, with reference to the ἀνακεφαλαίωσις in ψ (*op. cit.*, 578 f.). The lines which are found in whole or in part in other places in the poems are all set out, and are deemed sufficient, with

a few other alleged defects—which will be dealt with in another paper—to prove that the passage was composed by a wretched *Kompilator*. In ψ 314 it is the phrase ὁ μιν πρόφρων ὑπέδεκτο, which occurs in three other places. In 315 it is φίλην ἐς πατρίδ' ἰκέσθαι! In 316 it is ἀναρπάξασα θύελλα πόντον ἐπ' ἰχθυόεντα φέρεν βαρέα στενάχοντα, which is used in δ and ε. In 318 it is the words Τηλεπίλου Λαιστρυγονίην, in 322, 'Αἶδεω δόμον εὐρώεντα! 323=κ 492 and λ 165, ψυχῇ χρησόμενος Θηβαίου Τειρεσίαο. 325, μητέρα θ' ἦ μιν ἔτικτε καὶ ἔτρεφε τυτθὸν ἑόντα, is said to be taken, the first hemistich from X 428, and the second from α 435. But see also λ 67 and Θ 283, and cf. Λ 223, Ν 466, and other passages. And so on. Where we have not recognized epic commonplace, we have old phrases used of similar, or rather, in an ἀνακεφαλαίωσις, of the same situations. And unless we are to deny absolutely to the poet the privilege of repetition which is established by the whole body of the poetry and illustrated on every page of it, there is no reason for suspicion.

If the repetitions are to be relied on for disproving the originality of a passage, every parallelism in it must be considered, and cogent grounds discovered for the inference of imitation or plagiarism. Sober procedure of this kind is a characteristic of the commentary in Monro's edition of ν-ω. Reasons are given in many cases, and coming from a scholar of his standing in the modern Homeric world are of course entitled to weight.

The passages discussed by him are:

ω 39 f. (Agamemnon to Achilles, in Hades): σὺ δ' ἐν στροφάλιγγι κονίης κέισο μέγας μεγαλωστί, λελασμένος ἵπποσυνάων, which is = Π 775-76, "where λελ. ἵππ. is said—more appropriately—of the chariot-driver (Sittl)." Professor Scott, in *Am. J. Phil.*, XXXII, 315 f., has refuted this notion. But I think the argument may take broader ground. Monro and Sittl could have reason only if it be held that the word ἵπποσύνη must *always* mean "driving" and nothing else—not, for instance, "knighthood" (Seymour), *Wagenkampf* (Autenrieth), "chivalry" (Butcher and Lang), or "chivalrous feats" (Hayman). The objection has no regard to the wondrous variety of the meanings of words in Homer. One might add to Professor Scott's references Λ 503, of Hector, ἵπποσύνη καὶ ἔγχεϊ

μέρμερα ῥέζων, and Ψ 289, of Eumelus—a chief, not a ἡνίοχος—*ἱπποσύνη ἐκέκαστο*. In Ψ 307, *ἱπποσύναι* are glorified as a high accomplishment, which Zeus and Poseidon "teach" to men; and the noun has, as if in anticipation of Sittl, the adjective *παντοῖαι*. This case is surprising in its futility. Equally weak is ω 52: *Νέστωρ, οὗ καὶ πρόσθεν ἀρίστη φαίνεται βουλή*. The words recur, H 325 and I 94. "This formula is hardly appropriate here; Nestor has given no 'former counsel.'" The same argument is used by Wilamowitz in his essay on Θ, for which see *C.P.*, VI, 41. It is surely better, with Dr. Leaf on I 94, to interpret the adverb "*of old*, not with any particular reference," and the whole expression as meaning that Nestor was the *βουληφόρος ἀνὴρ* of the host *κατ' ἐξοχήν*. So Mure (*Hist. Gk. Lit.*, I, 330), quoting the formula.

ω 156–58: *τὸν δὲ συβώτης ἦγε κακὰ χροῖ εἴματ' ἔχοντα, πτωχῶ λευγαλέῳ ἐναλίγκιον ἥδὲ γέροντι σκηπτόμενον· τὰ δὲ λυγρὰ περὶ χροῖ εἴματα ἔστο*. "*περὶ χροῖ εἴματα ἔστο* is a repetition, in un-Homeric style, of the latter half of l. 156." Lines 157 and 158 are taken bodily from ρ 203 f. and 338 f. Homer is not particular, in such a case of the fresh use of old matter, as to what precedes. The final expression, with *λυγρὰ*, stronger than the preceding *κακὰ*, gives point to 159, which goes on to explain that the Wooers little thought that in the ancient beggar they beheld the avenging Odysseus. A further objection, that "*λυγρὰ* is awkward after *λευγαλέῳ*," betrays a very noteworthy disregard of Homeric practice. Any number of instances could be given. Even for Sophocles Jebb has more than once remarked (*Oed. Col.* 554, 709; *Electra* 475) that the Greek ear was not so fastidious in this matter as the modern.

ω 165 f.: *σὺν μὲν Τηλεμάχῳ περικαλλέα τεύχε' ἀείρας ἐς θάλαμον κατέθηκε καὶ ἐκλήϊσεν ὄχῆας*. The last two words "would naturally mean 'shut the door of the *θαλ.*' But they may be due to imperfect recollection of τ 30, *κλήϊσαν δὲ θύρας μεγάρων*, words which refer to the closing of the door on the women servants." They may be; and they may not be.

And these, let us pause to observe, are the instances which support the charge of imitation in the *Nekyia*. The late poets who thrust their additions on the Homeric corpus are known by their unblushing plagiarism. They even went so far as to compile centos out of the

old and genuine Homeric lays as they found them. To Hennings and many others the author of this *Nekyia* was one of a *Menge von Homeriden und Rhapsoden*, and a mere *Kompilator*. Yet the above set of flimsy cases are all that Monro could discover to support such a theory.

ω 235-40: "This passage is evidently modeled on κ 151-4. Note (1) the conventional lines 235=κ 151 and 239=κ 153"—this is hardly worth noting; no inference is to be drawn from such lines—" (2) the constr. of μερμηρίζω with the inf. in place of the usual ἦ-ἦ and an opt."—which occurs also in Θ 167 f. and κ 151 f. and 438 ff.—"and (3) πρῶτον in l. 240 answering to πρῶτα in κ 154." The πρῶτον corresponds, we may equally say, to the πρῶτα in l. 238 of our passage. All this is trivial. The gravamen of the charge is in what follows, "in this place a second alternative is inserted, introduced by ἦ and the opt., thus giving the extremely harsh form μερμηρίζε . . . κίσσαι καὶ περιφύναι . . . ἦ ἐξερέοιτο for 'debated whether he should kiss and embrace or should ask.'" The construction, or combination of two common constructions, is unique; that may be admitted. But as evidence of imitation it has no force whatever. The only evidence of imitation is in the πρῶτον, and that is not worth dwelling on. The rare construction rather points the other way. Why should a rare form of construction suggest an imitator? There are many such forms in the poems. Certainly the conclusion that the second alternative in 238 is an interpolation by some stupid meddler has at least as good warrant. Even if we cannot tolerate the single occurrence of the combined construction, we are not compelled to infer imitation.

ω 248: ἄλλο δέ τοι ἐρέω, σὺ δὲ μὴ χόλον ἐνθεο θυμῷ. "An adaptation—almost a parody—of the conventional ἄλλο δέ τοι ἐρέω, σὺ δ' ἐνὶ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῆσιν." The point surely is whether our line is less suitable in its context than the other would have been. Let anyone take the Concordances and scrutinize the 13 occurrences of the formula with βάλλεο, and then say! The Continuator has chosen the better part, but he never gives satisfaction. If he copies the *ipsissima verba*, it is imitation; if he varies them, it is parody. In the present case readers who are not critics would say that Odysseus' object in using the expression was to apologize in advance for remarks

to the old man which in these days we should call "personal" when made by a stranger.

ω 368 ff.: "This transfiguration of Laertes is an awkward imitation of the similar changes wrought on Ulysses in the course of the story: cf. σ 70." The selection of σ 70 is most unfortunate. Any critic wishing to discredit the episode in σ (the fight between the disguised Odysseus and the beggar Iros) will have equally good ground for saying *it* is in imitation of previous transformations.

But what is "awkward" in our case? The poet, whoever he was, wanted Laertes in the fight which was about to take place, and, with the privilege *quidlibet audendi* which is used in other parts of the poems, invokes Athené's aid to make him young again. Is that preposterous in this single instance? Some commentators actually like the rejuvenation of the old hero and his Nestor-like reference to *tempus actum* in 376 ff. Hayman very appropriately quotes Lear's, "I have seen the day, with my good biting falchion, I would have made them skip." But to others Laertes in his new rôle is as objectionable as the figure of Nestor in the *Iliad*, foisted into it (in their view) by the obsequious Neleids of the Ionian settlements. Van Herwerden in *Mnemos.*, 1903, 32, "easily recognizes the imitator," from Laertes' words, *quae Nestoris in Iliade personam referunt*. Nothing could be simpler. The same critic says (in the same place) of—

ω 397 ff.: ὡς ἄρ' ἔφη, Δόλιος δ' ἰθὺς κίε χεῖρε πετάσσας ἀμφοτέρας, Ὀδυσσεὺς δὲ λαβὼν κύσε χεῖρ' ἐπὶ καρπῷ, "*ex ultimis verbis recte imitatore agnovit Hartman, coll. E 458*"; and Monro remarks that "χεῖρ' ἐπὶ καρπῷ is a phrase that is hardly in place here." It is quite in place if one joins it with λαβὼν, with Ameis-Hentze, and Pierron, who quotes very effectively σ 258, δεξιτέρην ἐπὶ καρπῷ ἑλὼν ἐμὲ χεῖρα προσήδα. Cf. also Ω 671 f. Hartman was too easily satisfied with E 458. But it really seems to matter little which verb we take the expression with. The taking of the hand and the kissing of it were performed very near, if not on, the same spot of it.

ω 410: δεικανόνωντ' ἐπέεσσι καὶ ἐν χεῖρεσσι φύοντο. "φύοντο, used in imitation of the Homeric formula ἐν δ' ἄρα οἱ φῶ χειρὶ κτλ." (Monro). Mere assertion again. What is there in φύοντο? The form is not objected to. And observe, ἐν δ' ἄρα οἱ φῶ χειρὶ κτλ.

being extremely common, we have in one case in the poems, κ 397, of a number of persons as here, *ἔφυν τ' ἐν χερσὶν ἕκαστος*. So our Continuator has a phrase ready to his hand. Had he used it, it would have been taken as proof positive of imitation. He uses a phrase of his own; it is still imitation. He gets no chance; the prejudice against him must be indulged. *Non amo te, Sabidi*.

ω 479 f.: Zeus to Athené, οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτον μὲν ἐβούλευσας νόον αὐτή, ὡς ἦ τοι κείνους Ὀδυσσεὺς ἀποτίσεται ἐλθών; “=ε 23–24, where the sense is simpler: ‘you made the plan, and it is for you to carry it out.’” This is not much, but what could be simpler than our passage? “You yourself arranged that Odysseus should come and take vengeance on the Wooers. For the rest, do as you please. I think, now that your favorite is satisfied, you might very well arrange an amnesty and peace forever.” Cauver, *Grundfragen*², 486 f., observes that both Kirchhoff and Wilamowitz consider the passage in ω the original.

ω 534: τῶν δ' ἄρα δεισάντων ἐκ χειρῶν ἔπτατο τεύχεα. “The line is taken from μ 203,” which ends with *ἔπτατ' ἔρετμά*. “It is open to the objection”—already dealt with in my former paper—“that the use of a form like *τεύχεα* as the final spondee is not Homeric. One MS avoids this,” with *ἐκ τεύχεα ἔπτατο χειρῶν*, “but the change which it makes in the order of the words seems the emendation of a scribe”—who must, very strangely, have had no objection to hiatus, or knew the rule about the Bucolic Diaeresis. But keep *τεύχεα* and admit it is objectionable. Must we then say there is imitation? This repetition-hunting is really very dangerous work. Anyone wishing to discredit μ 203 in turn has the materials ready to hand. τῶν is objectionable there, and the use of *βόμβησεν* in the next line of the noise of a splash in water is certainly (in the critics' phrase) “not Homeric.” So, without discussing that interesting passage further, may we not say that 203 “has crept in” from ω 534? It may be added that the essential words, *ἐκ χειρῶν ἔπτατο*, are not confined to these two passages. They recur in λ 207 f., and there are similar phrases with *φεύγω* in Θ 137, Δ 128, and Π 403, and with other verbs in other places.

The only serious case in the whole list is the next line, ω 535, πάντα δ' ἐπὶ χθονὶ πίπτει, θεᾶς ὅπα φωνησάσης. Imitation has been

frequently alleged since the days of Düntzer. In the words of Monro, "*ὄπα* must be construed as a cognate acc. with *φωνησάσης*. It is not so in the formal lines on which this one is modeled"—B 182, K 512, where the words are *ὁ δὲ ξυνέηκε θεῶς ὄπα φωνησάσης*, and T 380, *ἄκουσε θεοῦ ὄπα φωνήσαντος*. This states the point—the imitator was a bad grammarian and did not understand the constructions in the lines he was reproducing. But before discussing it I would beg reference to Mr. Agar's *Homericæ*, 152 f., where a good case is made out for reading *ὀπί* not only in all our passages, but also in many other places in the poems.

But if we do not consider that demonstration conclusive, we observe that there is only this against the line in *ω*, that in the three lines from the *Iliad* *ὄπα* is said to be governed by either *ξυνέηκε* or *ἄκουσε*, whereas in *ω* it must be governed by *φωνησάσης*, which it cannot be. Now must *ὄπα* be so construed in the passages from the *Iliad*? Why may we not take *ξυνέηκε* as governing *θεῶς* and *ἄκουσε* as governing *θεοῦ*? Ebeling accepts this for *ξυνήμι*. We have, besides the middle in *τοῦ ἀγορεύοντος ξύνετο*, δ 76, *τοῦν δὲ ξυνέηχ'*, σ 34, and *ἐμέθεν ξύνες ὦκα*, several times. It might even be suggested that *ὄπα* does not go so well with this verb as words like *ἔπος* and *μῦθος* do. For *ἀκούω*, *Κίρκης* . . . *ἄκονον ἀειδούσης ὀπί καλῇ*, κ 221, is a good parallel. For further instances of the gen. of the person, see B 98, K 184, 276, M 273, O 506, II 211, Ω 223 (*ἄκουσα θεοῦ*), ι 497, and other places in the *Odyssey*. In fact the construction of these two verbs with the gen. of the person is as common as with the acc. of the thing. But then, it is replied, that involves taking *φωνησάσης* as governing *ὄπα* in *ω* 535, and although, outside that line, the verb occurs 156 times, it never once has this cognate accus. This sounds formidable till we analyze the 156 occurrences and find that all are in the formulae (with variations), *ὥς ἄρα φωνήσας-σεν* (initial) and *φώνησέν τε* (final), except one. This does not give much scope for variety in the use of the verb! The evidence is quite inconclusive, and is no bar to our believing that *φωνέω* could take such an accus., as it did afterwards in Attic. Hayman thinks this "probable, though by no means certain," in our line. He quotes Ameis' comparison, for a verb with an accus. cognate in meaning though not in form, of *λώβην ὑβρίζειν*, ν 169 f.,

and ζῶειν βίον, ο 491. So Sophocles' γοωμένην ὀδύρματα (*Trach.* 50 f.). But this seems to be all that the commentators have to say for the possibility maintained above. In spite of their unanimity one may venture to doubt. And those who side with them have still to reckon with Mr. Agar's careful exposition.

The conclusion I suggest is that the evidence is altogether insufficient to establish the interposition of the blundering imitator in any of the passages examined; and that this part of the case against the "Continuation"—that it is the work of a late poetaster who could not write and to borrow or steal was not ashamed, is very far from being made out.

A third paper will deal with the *Nekyia*, ω 1—204. The unanimity in favor of the spuriousness of this part of the "Continuation" is greater than against any other part of the *Iliad* or *Odyssey*. None so bold as do it the smallest reverence, and a defence of it must be almost literally *contra mundum*. The strong element in the case against it, and one that has been insisted on ever since the days of Aristarchus, is the new mythological atmosphere in which we find ourselves. There are ideas and beliefs which we find nowhere else in the epics, and so are "post-Homeric." On examination these great difficulties have proved unreal.

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